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P eople are dying in nursing homes. This maysound like a clarion call for a new wave of nurs-ing home policing; instead it is a statement of a
simple fact that we must embrace. Over 20 percent of
older Americans meet their deaths in a nursing home,
and 30 percent of all persons dying in hospitals have
been transferred there from nursing homes just a few
days earlier.
Understanding that people die in nursing homes—
and should die in nursing homes, just as they should be
able to die at home—ought to drive us to improve their
care. The literature is already rich with case studies and
demonstration projects undertaken by nursing homes to
improve care of the dying. Broader change requires a
shift in culture and a reframing of the issues. Contempo-
rary standards for nursing home quality and the accepted
framework for end of life decision-making have inadver-
tently placed obstacles in the path of good care for the
significant proportion of older people who will spend
their final days in a nursing home.
Enriching the Ideal for Nursing Home Care
The cornerstone of contemporary nursing home qual-ity standards has been the unequivocal repudiation
of the related beliefs that nursing homes are way stations
for the dying elderly and that decline is inevitable for
nursing home residents. Instead of being resigned to in-
evitable decline, regulators and professionals are commit-
ted to maintaining, if not improving, the physical, men-
tal, and social health of nursing home residents. This
hard-won expectation of active support for maintenance
and growth rather than mere caretaking has directed
nursing homes toward a more engaged and less fatalistic
care model. This change is good, in part because the
nursing home industry, regulators, and caregivers have
become alert to substandard care that had once hidden
behind routine acceptance of physical and mental de-
cline.
These rehabilitative, health-promoting expectations,
however, may have unintentionally produced a death-
denying culture within the nursing home. Regulations
impose standards that assume that physical, mental, and
emotional decline are signals of deficiencies in care unless
demonstrated to be otherwise. Physical changes com-
monly associated with dying, such as weight loss, have
thus become signs of failure, rather than a normal part of
dying, and so trigger requirements that the facility justify
its care. Because nursing home administrators are highly
sensitive to regulatory risk and avoid situations that may
attract the attention of regulators, the regulatory empha-
sis on positive indicators of health can discourage them
from providing good care to a dying resident. This dy-
namic is revealed, for example, by the fact that immi-
nently dying residents are often transferred to hospitals so
their deaths will not occur in the nursing home and re-
quire that care be defended. Failure to accept the indica-
tors of decline that naturally occur in dying may also be
reflected in the emphasis on tube feeding for nursing
home residents. Thus, the rehabilitative expectations,
captured and reinforced in regulation, skew nursing
home care models away from care of the dying.
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Before nursing homes can improve end of life care,
dying will have to find its place in the nursing home cul-
ture. For nursing homes, a shift in culture necessarily in-
volves paying attention to regulation and to the providers’
reactions to regulation as well as to other behaviors that
create and maintain a culture. Culture and regulation go
hand in hand in the nursing home environment because
of the pervasive scope of nursing home regulation, the en-
forcement orientation of regulators, and the intense risk
aversion of nursing home administrators. Efforts to make
room for the dying patient require a review of standards
and adoption of changes to facilitate the appropriate level
and type of care for them. Some have argued, for example,
that changes in the mandatory Resident Assessment Index
could more readily encourage nursing homes to provide
better palliative care. Such efforts should not require nurs-
ing homes to abandon their mission of health promotion,
however. Palliative care models view support of the dying
as active, positive, and promoting of health and human
values, even as agressive medical interventions aimed at
cure are relinquished. In addition, both hospices and
nursing homes engage in the most intimate forms of care,
and this shared experience can form a meeting ground be-
tween what are now often viewed as separate approaches
to care.
The challenge is to encourage the regulatory system to
accept the process of dying, with its accompanying physi-
cal and mental deterioration; to exercise restraint in the
use of interventions, including inquiries, that would oth-
erwise be pursued; and to do so without creating a shield
for neglect. Nursing homes are plagued by a reputation
for neglect and abuse, but gearing the entire system to ac-
count for the bad apples can inadvertently have the effect
that all homes provide less than optimal care for the
dying. Unintentional adverse effects are a problem for any
health care regulatory system, of course. They can occur
whenever health care professionals make decisions in pa-
tient care that are motivated not by the best interests of
the patient, but by the provider’s fear of litigation or
scrutiny by a regulator. Nursing home administrators
often try intensely hard to avoid doing things that would
trigger regulatory scrutiny because part of their profes-
sional obligation is to manage legal risks. This has a very
deep effect on patient care because the administrator has a
profound influence on patient care in the nursing home
(as compared to other health care settings). Such decisions
therefore raise ethical issues concerning the duties of
health care providers, including administrators, to pa-
tients, not only to the facility. While administrators have
a professional obligation to protect the facility, ethical du-
ties to residents’ well-being supersede their management
responsibility. Because of their influence on care, adminis-
trators cannot defer that ethical obligation to professional
caregivers.
Of course, the nursing home culture consists of more
than the regulatory environment. If the nursing home
culture is to make room for dying, the incremental pat-
terns that maintain that culture will have to be addressed.
Publicly marking the death of a resident by more than re-
distributing clothing or reassigning the “bed,” expressions
of sympathy to other residents and to family, and bereave-
ment support for staff can be significant in creating a cul-
ture that responds to the reality of death. Paying attention
to culture also broadens the focus to include the commu-
nity of caregivers in the nursing home. Often, direct care-
givers and residents in a nursing home differ in terms of
race and ethnicity, socioeconomic class, and culture. If
culture is taken seriously, the clashes in expectations and
values that occur between residents and caregivers—and
often between the professional and nonprofessional
staff—can be addressed as larger questions rather than as
individual conflicts with uncooperative caregivers.
Adjusting the Framework for End of Life Care
Improving the quality of care for the dying in nursinghomes is not solely a matter of nursing home culture
and regulation, however. It also requires adjusting the
general framework for end of life decision-making to bet-
ter account for the nursing home context.
One important characteristic of the dominant legal
and ethical framework for end of life care is the drive to
the crucible—a concentration on the cases that place fun-
damental values in stark contrast and thus highlight in-
tractable moral conflict. The paradigm case in the end of
life debate—whether nutrition and hydration should be
provided for a person in a persistent vegetative state—has
persisted as the test case for the moral and legal questions
for decades. But testing principles and decisions against
this paradigm can thwart progress in improving care for
the dying. By focusing squarely on issues that are more
commonplace, both in terms of incidence and in the
sense of shared values, nursing homes can improve the
lives of those who will die in their facilities. Rosalie Kane
argued that long-term care should emphasize what she
termed “everyday ethics”; similarly, the well-being of indi-
viduals living and dying in the care of nursing homes is
better served if we focus on the routine rather than the ex-
treme.
If nursing homes have a distinctive case in which key
ethical issues are embedded, it is the decision whether to
transfer the dying resident to a hospital. Unnecessary hos-
pitalization of nursing home residents when death appears
imminent is both a symptom of, and scaffolding for, the
culture that denies death and thus impedes the most ap-
propriate end of life care.
Studies indicate that hospitalization when death is im-
minent does not provide the resident with better treat-
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ment. Rather, such transfers can impair good care because
the hand-off to a new care team can result in absent or un-
clear transfer orders for pain and symptom management,
disruption of care plans developed with the resident or the
family, and the disturbance of moving to an unfamiliar lo-
cation. Reducing the incidence of unnecessary hospitaliza-
tions can improve care of the dying significantly in the
nursing home without facing a stalemate over the moral
values of human life and human caring.
A second “common” issue is improvement in pain and
symptom management. Unrelenting pain can interfere so
completely with thought, self-awareness, emotional en-
gagement, and social relationships that it can rob the in-
dividual of the experience of being human. But pain is
badly undertreated in nursing homes; studies report that
30 to 80 percent of residents receive inadequate pain
management. Pain management may be undercut by reg-
ulations intended to avoid excessive use of pharmaceuti-
cals, especially those that affect awareness. Efforts to im-
prove pain management confront a tendency on the part
of health care providers and family members to underesti-
mate pain in the elderly, as well as the tendency of the el-
derly to underreport pain for fear of being a burden. As-
sessing pain in people with cognitive impairment requires
intense effort. Improving pain management will not grab
the headlines or fuel the debates that withdrawal of nutri-
tion and hydration does, but it is the foundation for com-
passionate care for the dying.
Food and water—including medically provided nutri-
tion and hydration—carry symbolic weight, but especial-
ly in the nursing home setting. Nutrition and hydration,
and the nutritional status of the resident, are a core mea-
sure of adequate or deficient care. Deficiencies in diet and
hydration are commonly viewed as the root cause of sub-
stantial physical and mental impairments and of injuries
ranging from bedsores to mental confusion. Poor food
service and inattention to encouraging fluid intake are, in
fact, key indicators of poor nursing home care.
Nutrition and hydration in the nursing home are also
icons of the ethic of care. The better nursing homes, for
example, understand the social and emotional power of
eating. Despite the focus on health promotion, sometimes
the primary goals of nursing home care, especially for the
families, are to keep this person safe, to keep her warm,
and to keep her fed.
Tube feeding is not the same as eating, however. Its sole
justification is that it maintains the physical health of the
patient. When tube feeding does maintain physical
health, there can be a battle over whether continuing or
stopping is moral or immoral. Increasingly, however, evi-
dence indicates that a common intervention for tube feed-
ing in nursing homes—percutaneous endoscopic gastros-
tomy (PEG)—does not reduce the risk of pneumonia or
infection and may not reduce the risk of bedsores. This
new knowledge presents a challenge, or opportunity, anal-
ogous to earlier efforts to reduce the use of physical re-
straints in nursing homes. The two developments are sim-
ilar in that the common practice was supported by a
“common knowledge”—restraints keep residents safe and
PEGs keep them healthy—that has proven mistaken. As
with restraints, new knowledge about the negative effects
of medically provided nutrition and hydration should re-
duce recourse to tube feeding, even when the nutritional
intake of patients appears inadequate, while strengthening
rather than rejecting the values that support feeding.
The battleground of medically provided nutrition and
hydration for the PVS patient is fought ferociously be-
cause there is disagreement over the meaning of life and
the meaning of care. In contrast, the most significant nu-
trition and hydration issue in the nursing home for end of
life care may now present a question of fact rather than
contested value. Unless this common practice is uncou-
pled from its association with the crucible of the provision
of nutrition and hydration to the patient in PVS, the
shared values that support its reduction in use will not be
recognized.
Questioning the Assumptions
Different states have varying normative and legalframeworks for decisions concerning medical care at
the end of life. Furthermore, actual practice often differs
significantly from the principles established in the law and
in the ethics literature. In practice, for example, health
care professionals, families, and patients may bring more
nuance to the situation than either the law or the ethics
literature can encompass.
The challenge is to encourage the regulatory system to accept the
process of dying, with its accompanying physical and mental 
deterioration; to exercise restraint in the use of interventions, 
including inquiries, that would otherwise be pursued; and to do so 
without creating a shield for neglect.
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Three fundamental assumptions in the
current structure for end of life decision-
making are particularly ill-suited to the
nursing home environment. These are the
concepts that “end of life care” is synony-
mous with “care for the dying,” that the pa-
tient is the only person whose autonomy or
well-being has moral significance, and that
there should be a presumption in favor of
life-sustaining treatment.
Legal, ethical, and clinical decision-mak-
ing at the end of life still bear the mark of
their original emphasis on the significance
of terminal illness. The moral and legal dis-
tinction between terminally ill individuals
and others certainly has been modified
somewhat; however, the status of “dying”
still has significant connotations. More im-
portant, it assumes a recognizable process
with a beginning that is as clearly defined as its end.
For nursing home residents, the dying process is often
subtle and incremental. Is this pneumonia or this infection
the one that signals imminent dying, or will treatment re-
store the patient to her previous health status? The prob-
lem of recognizing the onset of dying may be an even
more serious problem among patients with dementia,
who constitute a significant population in nursing homes.
According to one study, only 1.1 percent of residents with
advanced dementia were identified by clinicians as having
a life expectancy of less than six months, while 71 percent
of those same patients actually died within that time-
frame.
The problem of identifying the beginning of the dying
process or categorizing a patient as “dying” is not only one
of medical uncertainty. It is, rather, evidence of a lack of
language and even a lack of concepts for this stage of
human life, even though it is a stage typical of so many
nursing home residents. The problem of defining when
someone can be labeled as “dying” is also a manifestation
of the denial of death and the fear that accepting a broad-
er “end time” will cause individuals to be neglected and
devalued. Unfortunately, when aggressive interventions
are pursued or when palliative care is withheld until one is
labeled as “dying,” individuals and their families do not
receive optimal care and support.
The dominant structure for decisions at the end of life,
however we define that period, single-mindedly focuses
on the well-being and autonomy of the patient, but this
too is a mistake; family members are not merely adjuncts
to the patient. Family members bear significant burdens
in the long-term care of an individual, even when that in-
dividual is housed in an institution. These family mem-
bers can experience significant physical, emotional, and fi-
nancial stress at levels that adversely affect their own
health, especially when they are older or are physically
vulnerable themselves. Their concerns and well-being
should be recognized as morally significant. Requiring
that families be singular and unflinching in their devotion
to the patient’s best interest not only demands the hu-
manly impossible but provides an insufficient moral ac-
counting of the situation.
The moral status of paid caregivers in a nursing home,
professional and nonprofessional alike, should not be de-
nied. Their voice also belongs at the table for what they
can contribute to understanding appropriate care for a
particular resident. Researchers have found that nursing
home staff use family terms to describe their relationship
with residents and view themselves as protective and car-
ing and intimate with the residents—sometimes more so
than actual family. Compensated paraprofessional care-
givers engage in the most intimate care of the resident
over weeks, months, or years. Even though they are often
paid less than people working at other, less demanding
positions, their commitment to caring is evident on a
daily basis.
The autonomy and well-being of family members who
bear the burden in the care of a dying person are morally
significant, despite cases in which family members are cal-
lous, distant, and opportunistic. Similarly, compensated
caregivers should be recognized as moral agents and their
voices should be considered in decision-making about in-
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dividual patients even though there may be conflicts in
values and culture, and even though there are cases where
compensated caregivers are neglectful or abusive. Such is
life; although the “exceptions define the rule,” general
practice should not be determined by the worst cases.
Bringing the conflicts and differences to the table may en-
rich our understanding of the best way to care.
Finally, the legal structure currently defers to individual
choice regarding life-sustaining treatment. Legal standards
defer to individual choice out of respect for the pluralism
and freedom that lead us to disagree on the “one right
thing” to do and out of fear that any diminution in the
commitment to prolong life would result in a devaluation
of human life, or that any community effort to identify
appropriate care would destroy personal liberty. Deference
to individual choice places confidence in the inherent
value of individuation even though identifying the choic-
es of incompetent individuals presents serious and familiar
difficulties. It is also a deference that weights the scale sig-
nificantly in favor of medical intervention. Thus the med-
ical intervention holds a favored position, not the individ-
ual’s life history and values or the more complex goals of
care.
With advances in palliative care as a discipline and with
increasing expertise in relieving suffering, it is time to con-
sider whether the presumption in favor of life-sustaining
treatment should be changed to a presumption in favor of
care that provides comfort, relieves suffering, or promotes
activities of daily living. Stating the presumption in that
fashion would bring the goals of palliative care to the fore-
front and put life-sustaining medical interventions in
proper perspective. People do vary in their preferences and
convictions. Allowing individuals to choose treatments
that do not relieve pain or promote function but putting
the burden on them to do so would support respect for
pluralism, freedom, and individuality without imposing
excessive burdens on individuals or their families when the
choice is merely unclear.
This essay necessarily speaks about nursing homes and
nursing home residents in general terms. Not all nursing
home residents are alike, however; and not all nursing
homes are the same. Some nursing home residents are
alert and engaged; others are in various stages of dementia;
some are insensate. Obviously, the goals of care for dying
nursing home residents and the expectations for nursing
homes will have to account for these variations. The term
“nursing home” itself is a catch-all phrase sometimes used
indiscriminately for many different levels of long-term
care. Even among skilled nursing facilities there is signifi-
cant disparity in how ill and disabled residents are, and
this, too, will influence appropriate care models.
The quality of nursing homes also varies considerably.
This essay leaves the problem of policing the bad apples
largely on the shelf. Although it is a significant problem,
the design and implementation of a regulatory system has
to follow the identification of appropriate goals and stan-
dards for quality of care rather than the goals and stan-
dards developed for purposes of enforcement. At the very
least, these two perspectives need to be in dialogue and
perhaps in tension; one arm of the effort should not ex-
clude the other.
Advocates for nursing home residents and those nurs-
ing homes in the leadership of best practices have worked
hard to dismantle the stereotype of the nursing home as a
warehouse for those who are declining into death. This
work needs to be protected. However, once dying is rec-
ognized as an undeniable part of living—including living
in a nursing home—it is clear that the ideal of health pro-
motion will have to embrace care for the dying.
Allowing individuals to choose life-sustaining treatments over those
that relieve pain or promote function, but putting the burden on them
to do so, would show respect for pluralism, freedom, and individuality
without imposing excessive burdens on individuals or their families. 
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